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Abstract
There is much existent literature within the field of political science documenting the
under-representation and under-inclusion of lower-income people in political processes. This
includes disproportionate deficits of lower-income people as voters, candidates, and as
office-holders. Discourse within this literature tends to focus on these gaps in particular,
examining class-related factors that may cause these voters to miss elections, the cost-barriers of
campaigning as a candidate, and that these communities are isolated from political elites and thus
lack political ‘ins’ that would get them selected as candidates by parties in the first place, for
example. However, there is a deficit of literature examining to what degree lower-income people
are able to be engaged through standard campaigning processes, particularly through
door-to-door canvassing, as well as the ‘harder’ aspects of this equation, such as logistical
barriers potentially posed by one’s housing environment. This project seeks to build on previous
discourse and to provide insight in response to this deficit in literature through examining
barriers to the interactions between lower-income people, particularly those living in large-scale
public housing, and campaigns. In order to accomplish this, this project incorporates literature
reviews of both academic and non-academic discourse, in order to gain a broader understanding
of these issues; interviews with those involved in political processes; and the examination of
lower-income public housing communities, particularly through a case study of the New York
City public housing system (NYCHA). Ultimately, this project affirms that public housing
residence serves as a notable barrier to campaign interaction opportunities for certain
lower-income populations. Finally, based on these findings, the project offers recommendations
to relevant parties, including campaigns and community organizers.
O’Brien 3
Introduction
While the matter of class has undoubtedly always played a role in politics and remains
politically ubiquitous, the topic of the role of housing and how it may prove additionally salient
remains underexamined. There is much existing literature which an differences in turnout rates
by class and how campaigns may act as a mitigating, or perhaps an exacerbating, force
countering or furthering these inequalities; however, there is a deficit of literature examining the
opposite direction of that dynamic, specifically regarding how exactly lower-income people may
or may not be able to interact with campaigns, particularly due to their specific housing
environments. This project seeks to uncover more information that may help ameliorate this gap
through the review of relevant literature,  informational interviews with individuals engaged in
politics, and a case study of NYCHA. Lastly, the project will examine methods that may help
ameliorate the persistent issue of inequality, through the analysis of interview responses with
stakeholders, and offer best practice advice on how improvements may be made to better engage
this cohort in recognition of these environmental limitations and potential opportunities.
Definitions
Who is a lower-income person? Who is a poor person?
Before delving into literature, it is important to understand who exactly qualifies as a
lower-income person, as this provides important context for barriers or limitations one may be
subject to. While at first glance, it may seem like it would be fairly simple to discern who exactly
qualifies as a lower-income person in the United States, this is actually fairly complex and
context-dependent. Although there is a federal poverty line, this line primarily indicates the
bracket of those who are the most poor or acutely poor, rather than lower-income, and also
proves problematic for several reasons.
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As of 2021, the Department of Health and Human considers the line for federal poverty
in the continental United States to be an annual income of $12,880 for one person.1 However,
this is not standard across all well-respected institutions that are either explicitly part of or
meaningfully related to the U.S. government. For example, in particular, as noted on the Health
and Human Servies website, the Census calculates the income level that demarcates those who
may qualify as “poor” in a different manner than the DHH estimation.2 Instead, the Census
Bureau adjudicates this matter using their own “poverty thresholds.”3 According to their 2020
thresholds, a person under 65 is considered to be poor if they make $13,465. However, it is
unclear what meaningful difference exists between these income amounts that would necessarily
protect an individual from experiencing what many of us would consider to be poverty.
Logically, a difference of roughly $700 would not alter a person’s means so strongly that they no
longer experience many of the same hardships of those who qualify as being in “poverty”
according to HHS’ guidelines. In this way, the federal poverty line, with its differing perceptions,
proves at least for our purposes not to be a coherent brightline for understanding socioeconomic
categories, due to its seemingly arbitrary nature. Moreover, in the context of the most major
cities in the United States, this petty arbitration between low income values, and the prospect of
3 “Poverty Thresholds,” United States Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html.
2 “Prior HHS Poverty Guidelines and Federal Register References,” U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/prior-hhs-poverty-guidelines-and-federal-register-references.
1 “HHS Poverty Guidelines for 2021,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Office of
the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.
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excluding those who are the poorest of the poor from the federal category of “poor,” becomes
even less useful, as cities largely draw lower-income people due to economic necessity, but also
tend to bring with them higher costs.
The economic environments of major U.S. cities indicate that more expansive categorical
definitions of poverty may be more useful for understanding who exactly may experience aspects
of poverty or class-related challenges, which may also extend to the barriers they face related to
the prospect of political engagement. According to the Pew Research Center’s Income
Calculator,4 a person may be considered to be lower-income if they make $34,000 in New York
City, $31,000 in Boston, or $32,000 in Los Angeles. Even more extremely, some social programs
within cities have even greater interpretations of income levels at which people may be
considered low-income or poor and thus qualify for government assistance. For example, such is
the case with the United States’ largest public housing system, the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA). In the NYCHA system, you qualify for an apartment5 if you are an
individual making under $63,700. Thus, due to geographic price differences, the aforementioned
interpretations of the federal poverty line and its resultant dichotomic brackets categorizing
people as poor or not poor based on a very low income limit actually exclude many people in the
United States who still face immense economic hardship to the point of financial insecurity. This
is particularly pertinent as most lower-income people tend to live in cities, where there are higher
5 “Eligibility,” NYC Housing Authority, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nycha/eligibility/eligibilit
y.page.
4 Bennett, Jesse, Richard Fry, and Rakesh Kochnar. “Are you in the American midle class? Find
out with our income calculator,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2020/07/23/are-you-in-the-american-middle-class/, July 23rd, 2020.
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numbers of large apartment buildings that offer a wider range of cheaper housing options in areas
close to work options which eliminate the necessity of car ownership, which presents an
otherwise additional massive financial strain. Yet, at the same time, cities may also tend to have
inflated rent prices, food prices, and more. Thus while economic necessity largely retains
lower-income people in cities, they are also squished by these high prices as they are at least less
costly than home and car ownership, and poverty line estimations prove unsatisfactory for
understanding poverty in an urban context, where people may have annual income notably
higher than $12,000, yet still experience many aspects of poverty.
Due to these seemingly arbitrary differences and distinctions in terms of what number
exactly qualifies a person as lower-income or poor, especially taking into account geographic
differences, for the purposes of this project, it will be more meaningful to interpret lower-income
status as an experiential category, rather than something that can be defined by strict numerical
cutoffs, as this will always solicit the question of why a person making $1 or $1,000 more no
longer qualifies as poor or lower-income, thus barring their ability to lay claim to lower-income
experiences of economic hardship. For the purposes of this project, we believe that these
experiential similarities are most usefully understood as being shared experiences of difficulty in
affording basic necessities or the inability to do this, such as the ability to afford rent, food,
childcare, transportation, and/or other foundational needs. For these reasons, this project is
distanced from considerations of exact income as it relates to class political experience, and
focuses rather on these experiences themselves, in particular being most concerned with the
shared experience of living in large-scale public housing.
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Background Literature Review
A wide body of literature exists documenting the present and past inequalities that limit
the ability of lower-income people to be politically active, including in terms of voting, as well
as being recruited into political processes, compared to individuals of higher socioeconomic
status. The current state of this issue within American politics is perhaps best articulated by
Brady, Schlozman, and Verba,6 who elaborate that:
Citizens in American democracy who wish to have an impact on politics have a
variety of options for exercising political voice by acting on their own, with others, or in
formal organizations… They can donate their time or their money. They can use
conventional techniques or protest tactics. They can work locally or nationally… While it
matters for democracy that there be ample opportunities for the free expression of
political voice and sufficiently high levels of participation across various political acts,
the distribution of that participation across individuals and organizations is also
significant. Citizens are not equally likely to undertake actions to let public officials
know what they want or need, political activists are not representative of the citizenry at
large, and a particularly acute form of participatory distortion results from the fact that
those who are disadvantaged by low levels of income and education are less likely to
participate in politics.7
7 Brady, Schlozman, and Verba, 2.
6 Brady, Henry, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Sidney Verba. "Introduction: Democracy and
Political Voice," The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of
American Democracy, 2012.
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In his novel The Cash Ceiling,8 Nick Carnes examines the mechanisms that account for
this comparative disengagement. In particular, Carnes sheds light on the barriers that exist to
lower-income people seeking out or declaring political candidacy as well as barriers that, in the
case that a lower-income candidate were to be running, would make it incredibly difficult to
succeed. In particular, Carnes cites the barriers of lower-income people tending not only to have
less financial capital, but also “less flexible schedules, fewer well-resourced friends, and less of
an appetite for risky endeavors.”9 Due to the fact that the very nature of democratic campaigns
relies on the fact that, going into the election, the outcome or winner is not already set, there is
always an inherent degree of uncertainty. Insofar as this uncertainty exists, it follows that there
also tends to be a disincentive to lower-income people to participate as candidates if left to fend
for themselves. Logistically, on a day-to-day basis, campaigning requires candidates to clear
their schedules as much as possible for meetings with community members, organizers, voters,
and more; candidates must hire and accumulate staff to broaden their reach to potential voters;
candidates must become seen around the community talking with voters or holding events;
candidates must decide on and accumulate their campaign platform, and build out advertising
materials and websites to make this information accessible. Insofar as there are so many moving
parts that require capital and external support as well as a clear calendar, this lift in many cases
logically becomes next-to-impossible if not utterly impossible for even lower-income people
who are able to be regularly engaged in politics and are interested, despite potential disillusion,
in becoming part of the political establishment.
9 Carnes, 138-139.
8 Carnes, Nick. The Cash Ceiling: Why Only the Rich Run for Office—and What We Can Do
about It, 2018.
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The sheer difficulty of this prospect is perhaps best conveyed through anecdotes by
candidates who have experienced this undertaking first-hand, who may provide more
comprehensive or humanizing detail. Carnes recounts the experiences of Edward Beard, a
lower-income candidate who ran for office in the 1970s and has spoken candidly about his
experiences through past interviews. According to Carnes:
For Edward Beard, getting to Congress was extremely challenging: he reportedly wore
out six pairs of shoes walking door-to-door during his first bid for the House of
Representatives. And according to Beard, his story would be impossible today. In an
interview in 2010, Beard put it bluntly: “I won for $12,000. That simply can’t be done
now.” Running for state or federal office was almost impossible for a house painter in the
1970s. Since then, the barriers to entry have only become harder to surmount: spending
on campaigns has soared in the last four decades, and the time and energy needed to field
a modern campaign have followed suit.10
This issue becomes increasingly dire when internalizing temporal context. As Carnes
notes, the aforementioned barriers discussed to candidacy and the ‘lifts’ being a candidate
requires are not only “high,” but are also “rising.”11 Concurrently, many of the barriers that exist
as barriers to lower-income candidacy also stand true for lower-income people even looking to
vote or engage at basic levels in their local political systems. For example, it intuitively stands
that if you cannot afford to take any amount of time off from work due to financial necessity, you




At the other end of the analytical spectrum from the realm of personal details, the barrier
of economic hardship has also been examined through top-down, transnational research, such as
recent work by Wilford.12 Work by Wilford in 2020 contains a meta-analysis performed that
examines data from “41 elections from 22 countries,”13 to uncover the comparative impacts on
political disengagement stemming from income inequality and economic hardship, taken
separately, in an attempt to help provide specificity to this discourse. Ultimately, Wilford finds
that economic hardship among lower-income people manifests strongly with negative voter
turnout, affirming the existence of class-experience related barriers even transnationally, while
income inequality itself has “little effect on voting.”14 However, inseparable from the role that
these physical barriers play is also the role of one’s perception of one’s political system.
As an extension of these inquiries, recently, more literature has appeared that helps to
tackle the question of what barriers may exist, outside of material barriers, such as the question
of what the role of perception may be. However, it also must be noted that the majority of
literature has focused on the turnout and political activity of lower-income voters or the potential
for this turnout in a manner that is unfortunately disconnected from considerations of the
political perceptions and experiences of lower-income people themselves. Moreover, when the
role of perception has been engaged with, there have been complicated or clashing dynamics
believed to be in place by researchers as well as well-known political theorists, resulting in there
being no set consensus on whether exactly a person’s immediate experiences of economic
14 Wilford, 317.
13 Wilford, 314.
12 Wilford, Allan. “Understanding the Competing Effects of Economic Hardship and Income
Inequality on Voter Turnout,” Politics & Policy, Volume 48, No. 2, 2020.
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hardship drive or hinder their prospects for political engagement, as evident within work by
Krauss of UC Berkeley15 as well as Wilford.16
Krauss has notably expanded and updated the prior scope of previous studies by focusing
on the role of perceived social status, rather than simply objective social status, and measuring
the relationship between this perceived status and political engagement, contributing to the
amelioration of this gap in literature.17 Ultimately, Krauss finds that perceived social status is an
important determinant of political engagement, and that a positive increase in a person’s
perception of their social status is correlated with an increase in the likeliness that that person
will participate in political processes.18 Thus, by extension, people who perceive themselves to
be of a higher social class status will be more likely to vote than people who perceive themselves
to be of a lower class. While this is likely what many people may assume to be intuitively true,
Krauss also notes that this is somewhat contradictory to other existing literature on class,
including political theory, most notably the work of Marx and Engels.19
A foundational thesis of theorists Marx and Engles’ perhaps best known work, The
Communist Manifesto,20 is that as conditions for the working class, the diagetic proletariat,
exacerbate and eventually become utterly unlivable, there will naturally be increased and
20 Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto, 1848.




15 Krauss, Michael W. “The Inequality of Politics: Social Class Rank and Political Participation,”
https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2015/The-Inequality-of-Politics.pdf, 2015, p.33.
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ultimately extreme political action, extending up to revolution.21 However, Marx and Engles are
not alone in their perception of drive toward political mobilization. Expanding on this
perspective, Wilford includes that a “similar number of studies have found support for
mobilization and increased voter turnout [as against, citing the work of] Arceneaux 2003;
Killian, Schoen, and Dusso 2008; Schlozman and Verba 1979.22 Demonstrating the roughly equal
support within the literature thus far for the perspective that those of lower socioeconomic status
may as a result experience political demobilization, Wilford additionally cites “Brody and
Sniderman 1977; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Rosenstone 1982; [and] Southwell 1988” as well as
work which contains indecisive findings.23
While at first glance it may seem contradictory that worse conditions and more
oppression would actually lead those who perceive themselves as lower-income to participate
less, rather than to rebel and become more engaged as Marx and Engles have famously
contended, there are also many intuitive arguments that may explain why this occurs, some of
which are also alluded to by Krauss. For example, if individuals do not trust the system will be
efficacious for them, or has their best interests at heart, as other literature I will discuss contends,
they may feel disillusioned with political processes or that there is no hope to improve their
condition with engagement, leading to potential disengagement.
23 Ibid.
22 Wilford, 316.
21 Marx and Engels, throughout.
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On the other hand, there are other studies that somewhat muddy the waters surrounding
the findings of Krauss and others, such as the work of Brunner et al.,24 and critique intuitions
related to class, political engagement, and political outcomes. This research group contends that
less income does not necessarily in effect result in having less political representation, as, based
on their examination of California legislators’ support for certain propositions, the make-up of
their constituencies, and constituent preferences, it seems that, for many propositions,
lower-income and higher-income people did not have meaningfully different political
preferences in the grand scheme of things, in particular not to the degree of rendering statistical
significance.25 However, there are several limitations which exist for this particular study by
Brunner et al. such as its specificity to California as well as its lack of statistical significance. It
is also very likely that those who are the least politically engaged or supported, or even perhaps
unwilling to engage, would also be the most likely not to be captured by this work, including its
survey, perhaps even due to class-tied or institutional experiences, and thus may have
meaningfully different opinions, but may not or do not participate for similar reasons that may
bar them to vote. However, critiques aside, even if literature were to demonstrate to the point of
statistical significance that, for propositions at large, there actually do exist quite meaningful
differences in preferences by class or income level, and if the goal of full political participation
were to become potentially significant for this reason, this is still troubled by other literature.
Particularly troubling is that other relevant literature exists which also espouses the challenges
that may still hold with full political participation. For example, in his book Representing the
25 Brunner, 28.
24 Brunner, Eric, et al. “Does Less Income Mean Less Representation?” https://economics
.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/Faculty/washington/less-income.pdf, 2012.
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Advantaged: How Politicians Reinforce Inequality,26 Daniel Butler broadly argues that even if
the United States were to obtain full political engagement, inequality and class bias would still
persist.27
One additional piece of research relevant to my work is a piece by Di Tella and
Rotemberg28 in 2018 which corroborates the tie between potential political perceptions of
candidates and class. Tella and Rotemberg use data from the 2016 election cycle to examine how
lower-income voters adjudicate between candidates, specifically focusing on the roles that
competence, disdain, and the idea of betrayal play in swaying the choice of this voting block,
across rural and urban settings, and also taking into account race.29 Ultimately, they find that if
lower-income voters feel they have been betrayed by elites, they are more likely to prefer a less
competent candidate rather than a more competent candidate to make it less likely that they will
be, in their view, once again purposefully betrayed.30 This research is just one example of
emerging work that qualifies previous studies which find a lack of class-tied difference in




28 Di Tella, Rafael, and Julio Rotemberg. “Populism and the Return of the ‘Paranoid Style’: Some
Evidence and a Simple Model of Demand for Incompetence as Insurance against Elite Betrayal,”
Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 46, no. 4, 2018, p. 988–1005.
27 Butler, throughout.
26 Butler, Daniel M. (2014). Representing the Advantaged : How Politicians Reinforce Inequality.
Cambridge University Press.
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However, regardless of what the alleged differences in opinion or perception held by
constituents based on class may be, or even if they do not exist, it is important to consider how
this actually translates to political implementation. The presence of differing opinions alone does
not necessarily result in varied political outcomes; eligible voters with different opinions must
come forth and engage in the political system or political processes through voting or other
means to have their even marginally different opinions incorporated into policy by their
legislators at least some of the time. In this way, who actually participates in voting and other
processes may have incredibly significant impacts on what political outcomes in the aggregate,
and especially if existing research has failed to capture the differences in opinion of those who
are the most overlooked or most disengaged by the current system. For these reasons, it becomes
incredibly important what role exactly “get out the vote”, or GOTV, initiatives may play in
reducing or exacerbating inequities in political mobilization. Research by Enos, Fowler, and
Vavrek31 has found that, at large, GOTV initiatives may actually worsen the disproportionate
nature of the electorate. As put by Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek, while “[explicitly testing] whether
GOTV treatments tend to reduce or exacerbate the gap in political participation. We find that
GOTV interventions, on average, tend to magnify the participation gap.”32 In particular, this
work focuses on ‘high-propensity’ and ‘low-propensity’ voters; however, class becomes
inherently relevant as, as put by Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek:
32 Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek, 273.
31 Enos, Ryan, Anthony Fowler, and Lynn Vavrek. “Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV
Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 76, No. 1,
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/renos/files/enosfowlervavreck.pdf, January 2014.
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Political scientists have extensively studied the correlates of turnout (e.g., Putnam 2000;
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), and this literature
suggests that high-propensity citizens will be systematically different from
low-propensity citizens across a number of politically relevant variables. Even though we
only have data on vote history and a few demographics, we argue that our propensity
variable is a proxy for many characteristics that we care about such as socioeconomic
status (SES) and issue positions.33
The findings from this study are not only quantifiable, but also statistically significant.
Ultimately the results of this examination are, as put by the researchers, that “In analyzing 24
field experiments, we find that two thirds of GOTV experiments mobilized high-propensity
voters to a greater degree than low-propensity voters— thereby exacerbating the participation
gap. Moreover, this exacerbating effect is statistically significant in eight cases.”34
Yet, research also suggests that issue- or community-specific campaign interventions may
have particular use for these marginalized populations whom traditional campaign GOTV efforts
would be less able to reach or successfully engage. For example, work by Davenport35
structurally affirms the potential utility of issue-specific organizing groups with pre-existing
community ties to uniquely reach these environmentally insulated communities through its
research design, which asks one such issue-specific organization, a tenants’ organization, to
35 Davenport, Tiffany C. “Public Accountability and Political Participation: Effects of a
Face-to-Face Feedback Intervention on Voter Turnout of Public Housing Residents,” Political
Behavior, vol. 32, no. 3, www.jstor.org/stable/40960942, 2010, p. 337–368.
34 Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek, 286.
33 Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek, 280.
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distribute a certain type of flyer demonstrating individuals’ personal voting histories during
face-to-face GOTV interactions, as well as, in other cases traditional GOTV interactions, in order
to test the efficacy of an added variable of “social pressure.”36 Inherent in the logistical basis for
this project is an assumption that only direct ‘ins’ with a pre-existing campaign with existing ties
to this community would make the canvassing by an external individual or group great enough or
significant enough to be able to yield a viable research project. From Davenport, we learn that, in
the case that you are able to reach communities of public housing residents, which implicitly
would be through the engagement of existing organizations or campaigns in the community with
pre-existing ties to community members, social pressure-based additions to these interactions
may prove particularly beneficial in improving turnout, as Davenport finds an increased voter
turnout of roughly 10% compared to “standard face-to-face mobilization” and 15-18% compared
to the control group.37
However, there is also literature that conveys the difficulty of canvassing public housing
residents, especially without previous connections to an existing campaign or organization which
already has built community ties. This issue is not only limited to public housing, but also
impacts larger apartment buildings in general, where lower-income people are more likely to live
compared to single-family homes, due to their comparative affordability. For external canvassers
seeking to door-knock, according to Griffard38:
38 Griffard, Molly. “Door-to-Door Democracy: Expanding Canvassing Rights to Promote





...Locked entrances and hostile apartment management often present insurmountable
challenges to reaching tenants within the building. In many jurisdictions, both public and
private building managers strictly enforce no-trespass policies, leading in some cases to
the arrest and prosecution of canvassers. When no-trespass policies are enforced against
canvassers, the apartment manager—whether private or public—denies the individual
households within the building the opportunity to accept or reject information from
canvassers.39
As a result, structurally, this indicates that due to the built environment of their housing,
wide swaths of predominantly lower-income residents are blocked from the opportunity to
receive political information disseminated through a face-to-face interaction.
Further exacerbating this issue is the issue of the no-soliciting sign. Within canvassing
discourse, in addition to in Griffard, the issue of canvassers feeling unwelcome and thus not
pursuing certain buildings or even actively being turned away, including being directed to do so
by signs, is well-documented. Some within this sphere, however, debate the validity of signals
such as the “no soliciting” sign, a fairly ubiquitous signal, and how canvassers ought act in
response to the sign. Writing for Georgetown’s Free Speech Project, Honl-Stuenkel resolves that
canvassers ought disregard the signs, due to the fact that the no soliciting sign “is irrelevant to
noncommercial home visits, be they for the purpose of religion, government, or politics.”40
Importantly, Honl-Suenkel also cites court precedents, including Citizens Action Coalition vs.
40 Honl-Stuenkel, Gustav. “Political Canvassing: Door-to-Door Free Speech,” The Free Speech




the Town of Yorktown, Indiana, which together affirm that door-to-door canvassing is
constitutionally protected free speech and that overly-limiting restrictions on canvassing and the
access or distribution of political information are thus unconstitutional.41 Even further, he
emphatically continues that “For campaigns, this means we can do our jobs enthusiastically and
thoroughly… and they certainly have a right not to answer the door or to slam it shut, but to me,
canvassing seems like a human and worthy, even noble, way to sustain democracy.”42 In
discordance, the ACLU of Pennsylvania writes that canvassers must obey “no soliciting” signs
and advise that if they face barriers, including those which are invalid such as the alleged
requirement of a permit, which is technically unconstitutional, canvassers ought cease
canvassing to avoid arrest or other threats to their wellbeing.43
Aside from Davenport, which provides much-needed specific focus on the potential
efficacy of campaigns in the context of those living in public housing,44 and Enos, Fowler, and
Vavrek, which provides much-needed broader insight on who exactly campaigns tend to
mobilize,45 there remains a relatively low amount of literature examining the role of campaigns
in this balance as well as the role of perception of governmental institutions by those identifying
as lower-income, particularly how these perceptions might be based in class-tied experiences
with campaigns, government institutions, and other entities. As with any knowledge gap, there
45 Enos, Fowler, and Vavrek, throughout.
44 Davenport, throughout.





may be the potential to improve understanding by academics through case studies, surveys,
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), and more.
Methodology
This project was conducted utilizing several different methods, which taken altogether,
may help improve the comprehensive nature of this inquiry. Outside of the traditional literature
review, one such method utilized to bolster our understanding during this project was the
inclusion of review of non-academic literature, included among our literature above as well as
within our case study described below, such as reputable news media, as well as other, more
informal sources, such as a Facebook event and NYCHA’s publications of rules for residents, in
order to complement what was learned through the review of academic literature. This method
also allowed us to capture more contemporary information as it was reported by popular media.
There is also much to be said about the democratization of internet-based means of
communication, such as social media, blogs, and more, which allow more people to engage in
discourse, including that which is related to politics, so long as they may access an internet
connection, and regardless of how inaccessible political circles may be to them offline. Thus, the
inclusion of non-academic information online also allowed us to get a better understanding of
potential organizing happening in online spaces for residents of public housing as well. In order
to provide further perspective, particularly on the roles of organizing bodies and established
governments, another method used was that of interviews with people immediately involved in
political processes, particularly two City Council office-holders in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in
order to gain further narrative information regarding the organization of lower-income people.
One specific aim of these interviews was to hear accounts of any potential difficulties
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interviewees have encountered related to matters of class and the ability to politically engage
constituents, as office-holders, campaigners, or community organizers.
The final and most significant method utilized in this project is a case study of the New
York City public housing system, administered by the New York City Housing Authority
(NYCHA), which includes previously carried out, original research seeking to estimate the voter
registration rate of residents. This research was undertaken to examine the hypothesis that,
among lower-income communities, those living in large-scale public housing projects may face
additional barriers, through a numeric approach. There are narrative instances that point to these
potential issues, including my own experience being denied entry to a high-rise public housing
project in Boston by a security staff member working as a doorman, as well a letter written by
the ACLU of Virginia condemning instances of the unconstitutional prohibition of door-to-door
canvassing of public housing in Virginia.46 Additionally, research by Griffard, mentioned above,
bolsters this concern. As there are thus at least a few instances of this occurring across multiple
states, documented by narrative and academic literature, we hypothesize that this may potentially
point to a greater, perhaps nationwide, issue of denial of entry to public housing for canvassers
worth examining more closely, which we carried out through the NYCHA case study. In
particular, in order to gain more knowledge about this issue, our project47 examined the issue of
47 This research project was conducted as a UROP in the Fall of 2019 as part of a research team
with Professors Maxwell Palmer and Katherine Levine Einstein, both of whom contributed
invaluably to the analysis and content mentioned herein.
46 Willis, Kent. “Re: Prohibition of Door-to-Door Political Advocacy,” ACLU of Virginia,
https://acluva.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/20080731-Canvassing-in-Publi
c-Housing.pdf, July 31st, 2008.
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the role of campaign access and access to organizing groups as crucial to political involvement
using a related, statistical perspective, determining the estimated percentage of currently
registered voters living in public housing in New York City, administered by the New York City
Housing Authority (NYCHA), compared with the estimated rate of registered voters in the city at
large.
More specifically, the statistical analysis of voter registration within the NYCHA system
was carried out using the following methodology:
This research work we undertook to seek out the rate of voter registration within the
NYCHA system was conducted through quantitative analysis of publicly available materials
related to voting in New York City, NYCHA, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), and NYC voter registration records from 2018.48 The first step of the
project was to transpose a list of all developments, projects, and associated addresses onto an
excel spreadsheet from a PDF of NYCHA’s development guide. The excel spreadsheet consists
of the names, addresses, and zip codes for all developments. Next, we removed all addresses
associated with garages, signified by “GAR” on the development guide. Additionally, we
removed all addresses for mixed-finance, Section 8, LL, and MHOP developments, in order to
isolate a list of only public housing-associated addresses.
Next, we used an R-based computer program49 to conduct a cross-comparison of all
addresses on our remaining list with the NYC 2018 voter file. Using the same program, we
49 Analysis conducted via R during this project was conducted by Professor Maxwell Palmer, a
member of the research team.
48 NYC Voter Records, 2018. Note: Access to these records was obtained via the Boston
University Department of Political Science.
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obtained totals of all voters registered to the remaining addresses associated with all projects.
Then, using Microsoft Excel, we obtained a sum of all of the voters we found registered to all
relevant projects. After finding the total number of registered voters, we estimated the
voting-eligible population by age through the consultation of publicly available NYCHA data.50
From the NYCHA data, we referenced the number of public housing residents in total and the
number of public housing residents who are under 18, then subtracted the latter from the former
to gain an estimate of the voting-eligible population by age, which we believe to be around
250,000 people. Next, we found the proportion of the population of registered voters to the
voting-eligible population by age to determine the rate of registration, which thus also provides
an absolute maximum for voter turnout.
In addition, to gain a maximum estimate of the rate of registration, or a conservative
estimate of what the gap in registration rates may be, we factored in the consideration of any of
the 250,000 people living in public housing that are eligible to vote by age, but may not be
eligible to vote due to their immigration status. In order to do this, we found estimates of the
number of people living in HUD-supported housing51 as part of “mixed families''52 or households
in which not every member has qualifying immigration status to recieve government benefits,
52 “Tenant Selection and Assignment Plan,” NYCHA, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/down
loads/pdf/TSAPlan.pdf, February 12th, 2020, p.18.
51 “Regulatory Impact Analysis: Housing and Community Development Act of 1980:
Verification of Eligible Status,” Department of Housing and Urban Development,
https://www.regulations.gov/document/HUD-2019-0044-0002, April 15th, 2019.
50 “NYCHA Resident Data Book Summary,” NYCHA, https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Housing-D
evelopment/NYCHA-Resident-Data-Book-Summary/5r5y-pvs3/data, 2019.
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meaning at least one member is not a citizen, permanent resident, asylee, refugee, or the recipient
of a relevant visa, narrowed this to find a New York state-specific estimate, narrowed this to the
number of people who have qualifying status, and then narrowed this by subtracting out the
estimate of individuals who are under 18 years of age, through utilizing percentages made
publicly available by HUD.53 This was over-estimated so generously as we were unable to locate
data detailing how many individuals living in mixed families or how many non-citizens
specifically live within NYCHA public housing projects. This number was then subtracted from
the 250,000 to estimate what the rate of registration is quite generously, assuming that all
members of mixed families in NY live specifically in NYCHA public housing and that no
members of mixed households eligible to receive public benefits and eligible to vote by age are
currently eligible to vote, which we estimate would result in an overestimated maximum of the
potential voter registration rate of NYCHA residents in public housing. Next, the proportion
estimation was repeated by dividing the number of active, registered voters by (250,000 - this
population) and multiplying by 100 to obtain a percentage value.
Results
Campaigns and Income in Non-Academic Literature
When evaluating the role of campaigns in engaging people of all socioeconomic
backgrounds in political processes, it is first important to examine the makeup of these
campaigns themselves in order to understand if they are likely to have the pre-existing
community connections that allow more access to lower-income communities and also allow for
the inclusion of the perspective of lower-income community members in rooms where campaign
decisions about strategy and other ventures are being made. On this point, the review of
53 “Regulatory Impact Analysis…”
O’Brien 25
non-academic literature provides great understanding. In such literature, it is well-established,
within news, popular media, and even elsewhere, that campaign workers are paid very little, if at
all. One great example of this is a website from Harvard Law School which advises students
considering campaign work to consider the work’s historical norm of low or non-existent pay.54
This issue additionally received attention during the 2016 presidential election cycle, with
articles being written critiquing the use of low- or un-paid labor by both the Clinton55 and
Trump56 campaigns. Thankfully, there have been signs of improvement in regards to this norm
during the 2020 presidential election cycle,57 with more campaigns increasing their pay for
interns, however there is still a notable persistence of unpaid positions, that renders campaigns to
be largely exclusive of lower-income people in general, let alone members of harder-to-reach
lower-income communities.
57 Akin, Katie and Claire Ulmer. “Paying campaign interns, once rare, is now the norm for
presidential campaigns. Find out which Iowa candidates pay theirs,” The Des Moines Register,
https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/elections/presidential/caucus/2019/08/26/2020-d
emocratic-campaigns-paying-interns-minimum-wage-biden-unpaid-internships-warren-sanders/1
808214001/, August 30th, 2019.
56 Wade, Peter. “Donald Trump Doesn’t Pay All of His Campaign Staffers,” Esquire,
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/news/a48320/trump-unpaid-staff/, September 3rd, 2016.
55 Jacobs, Ben. “Hillary Clinton's unpaid intern limbo: a grassroots campaign of 'free help,'” The
Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/13/hillary-clinton-unpaid-summer
-intern-campaign, June 13th, 2015.
54 “A Quick Guide to Working on Political Campaigns,” Harvard Law School,
https://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/a-quick-guide-to-working-on-political-campaigns/#tab1-2.
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Moreover, it is also important to understand how campaigns play out and what tools exist
at their disposal other than door-to-door canvassing, particularly if they are trying to reach these
insular communities without existing connections. For at least a decade now, the landscape of
campaigns has transformed, largely to include the use of social media as a powerful tool, in
addition to the longer-present widespread existence of phone and email access. For example, the
use of social media, particularly Facebook, by the Obama campaign leading up to the 2008
presidential election was widely taken note of by journalists, who remarked its usefulness as a
broad-reaching campaign tool.58 In addition to the use of pre-existing social media networks, the
Obama campaign was able to further extend their organizing abilities through the creation of a
campaign-specific social media platform, “My.BarackObama.Com, which boasted millions of
individual users.”59 This strongly points to the potential opportunities to be had for organization
on social media in the future if yielded wisely by campaigns.
Insights from Informational Interviews
While it is unfortunately difficult to find literature describing how politicians
communicate with lower-income populations, thankfully, during the course of this project, I had
the opportunity to interview two Cambridge city council members, Jivan Sobrinho-Wheeler and
Quinton Zondervan (11/30),  both of whom provided great insight on our research inquiries
based on their experiences. Regarding the context of political participation and who exactly tends
59 Havenstein, Heather. “My.BarackObama.com social network stays online after election,”
ComputerWorld, https://www.computerworld.com/article/2534052/my-barackobama-com
-social-network-stays-online-after-election.html, November 10th, 2008.
58 Carr, David. “How Obama Tapped Into Social Networks’ Power,” The New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html, November 9th, 2008.
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to participate most in local politics, both councilors affirmed that class plays a notable role. As
Zondervan remarked, “For various reasons it’s easier to only hear from the rich people… they
have more time available to talk to you about their issues… whereas people who have less
income… they don’t have time… it’s very difficult to be poor so you don’t often hear from
them… so my office reaches out.” This was bolstered by Sobrinho-Wheeler, who detailed that
“the folks who turn out for public comment… tend to not always be representative of the city as
a whole… if you have two jobs… not something everyone can do… [although] Zoom has made
this easier.”  In order to help correct this, Zondervan noted that his office goes out of their way to
engage lower-income voices in their local politics, primarily through in-person communications
and events that draw a wide audience, and then following up with these individuals specifically
to connect them with relevant council meetings and public comment sessions. Interestingly, he
also noted that his office has faced noticeable backlash in their attempts to more directly involve
lower-income people in local politics, from the level of non-profits, contractors engaged in
politics, and those more directly involved in public office.
Both council members stressed the importance of grassroots organizing groups,
particularly renters and tenant organizing groups, as a force that benefits better political
representation for lower-income people, as well as the in-person events they hold, with
Zondervan remarking that “this creates opportunities for direct interaction” as well as for better
“two-way communication” between constituents and those in office via these robust
organizations. Both also affirmed the barriers related to some public housing units being
structurally uncanvassable, Zondervan agreeing that “those challenges are very real” and
Sobrinho-Wheeler adding that “there are some public housing [buildings]… that are really easy
because they’re low-rise… and there are places that are really big… impossible to get into.”
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Zondervan also indicated while answering a question regarding potential exploitation by groups
of class politics that this is not absent on the left, as an extension of this also discussing the
harms of lower-income disengagement. As Zondervan recounted, “there’s an organization called
A Better Cambridge… they’re primarily young professionals who rent in Cambridge who are
concerned, rightly so, rent prices are through the roof… where I part ways with them is their
solution is we need to build tons more housing to make housing cheaper… and then what they do
is they say you’re hurting poor people… here is a class of people who are mostly white [and
privileged]…” and appeal that they are doing what will help lower income people. However,
concerningly, Zondervan noted that “when we talk to actual low-income people in Cambridge,
most of them don’t agree with this at all.” Speaking more broadly on the issue of this disconnect,
based in asymmetric political engagement, he explained that “there’s no counterweight… there’s
this void, and more organized, privileged groups get in there.” Yet, further complicating the
matter of the exploitativeness of campaigns, Zondervan also posited that exploitation is an
element that may perhaps be inherent in politics, as it is a game of vote-getting in which there
will always be some element of trying to convince another party to vote for you specifically so
that you win election or re-election. However, more optimistically, based on his other responses,
it did not seem the case that he believes this factor renders political processes not worthwhile or
too overtly exploitative to be meaningful. Rather, he instead stressed the importance of the
inclusion of marginalized communities as a force to secure more, necessary benefits and so that
their interests are better executed. These responses shined a light on the potential success of
GOTV initiatives that operate with lower-income communities at the center or more specifically,
rather than general, traditional GOTV initiatives.
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Case Study: NYC Housing Authority (NYCHA)
Figure 160
The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) manages, oversees, and operates the
largest public housing system in the United States. As a result, NYCHA contains an incredibly
large number of potential voters. According to the organization’s 2019 “Fact Sheet,”61
“NYCHA’s public housing serves 166,870 families and 381,159 authorized residents… [and]
NYCHA public housing represents 7.9 percent of the city’s rental apartments (2017 NYC
Housing and Vacancy Survey) and houses 4.4 percent of the city’s population (July 2017 U.S.
Census Estimate).”62 To place its numbers within local context, demonstrating its immense size,
on infographic materials, NYCHA notes that it “serves 1 in every 15 New Yorkers” (Figure 1,
above). As a result of its size, NYCHA is also incredibly well-documented and thankfully
relatively easy to examine through the use of open source information. For our case study, we
62 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
60 “NYCHA 2019 Fact Sheet,” NYCHA, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/N
YCHA-Fact-Sheet_2019_08-01.pdf, 2019.
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first examined the sphere of campaign activity within NYCHA and secondly, NYCHA’s
comparative voter registration.
Regarding our first area of concern, NYCHA occupies a very interesting space when it
comes to canvassing. After intensive research for open source information documenting
canvassing initiatives within NYCHA, no instances of presidential or other candidate-based
campaigns can be found. In fact, our research came upon only one piece of documentation of a
canvassing initiative by a campaign for the largest project within NYCHA, Queensbridge
Houses, in the form of a Facebook event from 2019, hosted by local activists and a grassroots
issue-specific, tenant-interest campaign, “Fight for NYCHA,” which seeks to maintain
NYCHA’s public status, rather than privatization.63 According to the Facebook event, two people
attended this event and five other people indicated that they were interested. It is unclear whether
those involved in this canvassing event were successful in their attempts to canvass, if, due to
low turnout this event did not manifest, or if the activists were turned away. Our attempts to
contact this campaign were also unsuccessful. Moreover, more generally, even upon examination
of NYCHA rules and regulations regarding their guest policy, the issue of whether or not
campaigners or canvassers are explicitly allowed remains unclear, as “House Rules” state that
“invited guests” and “persons with legitimate business” are allowed, yet “legitimate business” is
63 “Canvassing and Organizing NYCHA,” Fight for NYCHA, https://www.facebook.com/events
/queensbridge-houses/canvassing-and-organizing-nycha/854237784926179/, March 3rd, 2019.
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never defined and there exists no history of documentation of successful external canvassing in
NYCHA, although, as previously discussed, this would very likely be unconstitutional.64
To obtain more narrative information about past and ongoing attempts to canvass
NYCHA, I reached out to several grassroots organizations found online which explicitly mention
canvassing NYCHA on their respective websites via email. Unfortunately, as has been a
common struggle throughout the project, we did not receive a response. This poses quite a
troubling issue in two ways. First, this may imply that canvassing in NYCHA is not currently
happening or historically does not happen or, second, this may imply that if such initiatives are in
fact ongoing, then hypothetical residents seeking out such upcoming canvassing events online,
particularly in this moment where in-person interactions and exchanges are so limited, would not
happen across them organically, nor would they be able to find them through very
subject-specific searches. In the case that they are able to locate one or several such
organizations which claim the intention of seeking to canvass NYCHA in their mission
statement, and they decide to email these organizations, it seems they would also face a quite low
response rate.
Moreover, any documentation of canvassing in reference to NYCHA that has been able
to happen is largely in regards to recent NYCHA-led initiatives to canvass its projects amid a
lead scandal. Perhaps most tellingly, among these accounts, there is at least one which details the
progress of canvassing made before October 2020, providing a clear picture of what a massive




and time-consuming process canvassing NYCHA is.65 Moreover, the numbers starkly speak for
themselves. As articulated on their “2019 Fact Sheet,” “NYCHA has 173,762 public housing
apartments in 2,351 residential buildings in 316 individual developments throughout the 5
boroughs.”66 The implications of this are incredibly salient. If even the United States’ largest
public housing network, with its immense size, lacks the resources to quickly canvass all of its
own properties and units, which you would intuitively expect them to be able to do for the
purposes of issues like large-scale or building-wide water, heat, or electric malfunctions, then
even in a perfect world where campaigns are able to enter and canvass NYCHA, it is expected
that they would still face a massive uphill battle in their attempts to reach every unit, let alone
every resident. In fact, they are also less likely to be able to contact each resident due to other
class-related imposed difficulties. For example, logically, the poorer you are, the more necessary
it is to hold multiple jobs for extra money, meaning that you are likely going to be out of your
home more often due to your additional, necessary work commitments. In addition to its logical
basis, this concern also has a quantitative basis, as of 2019, “46.1 percent of NYCHA families
are working,”67 and thus may not be home when canvassed, depending on their schedules, which
may also be more strenuous than average, more well-off voters. Due to this host of factors,
despite existent barriers, it largely seems that the best means through which to reach public
housing residents will be methods that are particularly tailored to the availability of community
67 Ibid.
66 “NYCHA 2019 Fact Sheet.”
65 Smith, Greg. “Count of NYCHA Apartments With Lead Paint — and Kids — on Pace to Hit
20,000,” The City, https://www.thecity.nyc/health/2020/10/25/21533629/count-of-nycha-apa
rtments-with-lead-paint-and-kids-on-pace-to-hit-20k, October 25th, 2020.
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members, which can only best be gauged through building personal relationships with them
through regular organizational on-site presence.
Figure 2
Regarding the outcomes of the statistical inquiry, the second part of our NYCHA case
study, the results were as follows.
According to our search of the NYC voter file,68 our version of which is up-to-date as of
the 2018 primary elections, there are 171,939 voters registered to addresses associated with all
non-garage, public housing addresses listed in NYCHA’s publicly available development guide69
document. This number only consists of the addresses associated with public housing, not
mixed-finance or MHOP structure addresses.
69 “NYCHA Property Directory Development Guide,” NYCHA, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/n
ycha/about/developments.page.
68 NYC Voter Records, 2018.
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Publicly available data from New York City cites that “73 percent of eligible voters in
NYC were registered” as of 2016.70 This percentage serves as a rough baseline which we can
meaningfully compare our estimate of the rate of voter registration of those living in New York
City in public housing against.
As mentioned in our methodology, one of the first steps necessary to complete was to
obtain a rough estimate of the number of people living in public housing in New York City who
are likely eligible to register to vote. We were able to accomplish this task through consulting
publicly available data from NYCHA.71 This NYCHA data estimates that there are 371,198
people living in NYCHA public housing, 96,198 of which are minors under 18.72 Thus, there are
roughly 250,000 people living in NYCHA public housing who are eligible to vote by age. If you
estimate the proportion of registered voters of those eligible using the total number of voters
we’ve counted and the estimate we provide above, the percent of people who are registered
voters of those eligible is 68.78%, which is a little over 4% less than the proportion of eligible
voters that are registered in New York City at large. However, it is unclear how many voters
ineligible by immigration status are included in this data and thus in this general estimate. Thus,
further calculations were instead carried out using HUD estimates of mixed families living in
HUD-supported housing.
According to publicly available documents from HUD, there are roughly 25,000 mixed
households living in HUD-supported housing, including public housing and housing of other
72 Ibid.
71 “NYCHA Resident Data Book Summary.”
70 “Social Indicators Report: Update to the 2016 Report,” NYC Mayor’s Office, https://www1.
nyc.gov/assets/opportunity/pdf/Social-Indicators-Report-Upd-2018.pdf, September 2018, p.37.
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kinds, across the United States, which HUD believes to total around 108,000 people.73 Moreover,
around 12% of these people live in New York state, which we calculate to translate to there being
roughly 12,960 people living in mixed families in HUD-supported housing across New York
state. According to the same HUD document, 71% of these individuals, on average, are eligible
to receive public housing benefits and 73% of these eligible individuals, on average, are children.
According to further calculations we conducted based on this data, in New York state there are
roughly 2484.43 individuals living in HUD-related housing, not necessarily exclusively public
housing or in projects, who have immigration status that renders them eligible to recieve public
benefits and are also 18 years of age or older. If we assume all of these individuals, currently
included in the estimate of 250,000, live only in public housing and projects and are ineligible to
vote, we can obtain a generous, hard maximum estimate of the proportion of voting-registered
public housing residents in NYCHA from those eligible, estimating off of a notably reduced
pool. If we assume that all of these individuals are not eligible to vote currently, the proportion of
those registered becomes 69.47%, which is still over 3% less than the rate among the New York
City population at large. Thus, even if the quantitative analysis is performed to obtain a quite
conservative estimate of the gap, we still find over a 3% gap in the voter registration of this
cohort compared to eligible voters in New York City at large. This is incredibly significant given
how many voters this corresponds to on this scale: around 78,000 eligible voters who we
estimate to not be currently registered, living in NYCHA.
The primary finding of our undertaking is that we estimate that the gap in registration is
no less than 3%. While this percent difference in registration between NYCHA residents and
NYC residents at large was smaller than the research team anticipated, this is still incredibly
73 “Regulatory Impact Analysis…”
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significant as this percent represents a notably large group of people which, for one reason or
another, are not able or do not wish to engage in political processes directly affecting them
through conventional means. Moreover, this estimate may be an even greater overestimate
insofar as it likely includes people who have moved away from these addresses but have not yet
reregistered, among others. Thus, the gap in registration may be even larger than what we have
been able to quantify here.
Recommendations
For political entities (campaigns, etc)
Thankfully, as time continues to pass, we have seen more and more examples of
campaigns that effectively organize voters from all backgrounds and socioeconomic statuses.
These prior campaigns may provide narrative guidance in navigating ventures for even further
increased organizing in the future. For example, as previously mentioned, the success of Barack
Obama’s campaign to revolutionize the use of social media and campaign-specific media.
However, at the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has also exposed additional weaknesses
which may not be perceived as typically important or even exposed during usual campaign
seasons. A primary issue faced during our research process was that of non-response. It is logical
that this problem would be faced particularly at this time, as it is expected that community
organizations and entities like public housing authorities seeking to uphold foundational needs to
vulnerable populations, making them difficult to reach for other, specific purposes or perhaps in
general due to volume overload. This underscores the need for existing community connections
and networks made in the case that people are physically out of your reach. Based on these
findings and challenges, we would offer several recommendations to groups of various kinds
O’Brien 37
relevant to the matter of political access for lower-income people experiencing structural
isolation.
Our primary recommendations are to community organizing groups, as these were
emphasized as central to the potential ability to engage these isolated communities in political
processes, through our informational interviews as well as prior literature, such as that by
Davenport, which utilizes such a group as a crucial part of its design. One primary concern faced
in our attempts to learn about and to contact these community organizations was that of apparent
inactivity, including non-response. This issue presented itself through our literature review, with
there being essentially no documentation of campaign canvassing in NYCHA, for example, in
our own attempts to contact organizations carrying out work with lower-income populations, and
our informational interviews with Councilmen Zondervan and Sobrinho-Wheeler. As a result,
our first recommendation regarding community organizing groups would be to pursue the
establishment of such groups within these communities or to re-establish such groups. One
method that may prove useful for this, for both prospective and existing organizations seeking to
build relationships with these communities, is to be present at or hold in-person events,
particularly those that are issue specific, and even related to tenant causes, in areas that are
physically accessible or immediately near the community in question. This will prove
particularly crucial as we progress past the pandemic and many are emerging having experienced
months, if not years, of political inaccess during a time of some of the most severe harms. This
also emphasizes the importance of community-building, especially in person, as a preventive
measure, which will facilitate a virtual transition if ever necessary or preferred as a means of
organizational expansion, as these networks will already be strongly in place. Due to the
resounding importance of building these connections, we would also advocate devoting
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organizational resources to accomplish this, even if doing so may result in a short-term reduction
in organizing, so that you will be able to contact constituents when it is most dire. In terms of
particular network-building strategies, we would also recommend that organizations consider
utilizing ‘snowball’ recruitment methods to build a community network off of a single
connection within an insular community, such as that of public housing or large apartment
residents, as Councilor Zondervan mentioned the success of identifying leaders within such
communities, particularly the homeless community living in shelters in Cambridge, as a starting
point for an organizing network. This will allow organization to trickle throughout the insular
community, as identified leaders or activists may help mobilize individuals they are close with,
and this can continue, helping to build a thread inside the community, even if doing so is
inaccessible to the external organization who identified and developed a relationship with the
community leader.
A second crucial group relevant to our concern is that of campaigns. We would largely
recommend that campaigns take steps that mirror our advice to community organizations. In
order to build community connections, we would recommend campaigns engage in partnerships
with these organizations, particularly in the form of presence or partnership at in-person events.
Once this is accomplished the campaign may then have the ability to shift any aspects of
communications it must online and may seek to utilize social media for further organizing, as
proved successful by the Obama campaign. We would also recommend that, rather than just
tapping into these isolated communities as voters, campaigns also seek to include community
members as campaign workers, with a notable stipend or liveable wage, and even encourage
community members to pursue further paid organizing work and consider promoting them within
the campaign.
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We also recognize that sometimes it may be the case that party-based, rather than
candidate-based, campaigns may also engage in organizing and canvassing. For party organizing
initiatives, we would also offer several recommendations. In terms of recruitment and breaking
into insular communities, we would recommend that parties engage in more partnerships,
particularly at in-person events, with community organizations with established connections that
already engage lower-income or generally under-represented communities. However, we also
believe that our findings provide evidence that there are greater structural issues in the political
environment that require support at a foundational level, without which political participation
becomes difficult if not impossible. In recognition of this, we recommend that party networks or
establishments consider instituting an affirmative action policy to select and support a greater
number of candidates from lower-income backgrounds and/or consider setting aside more party
funding specifically to support the selection and success of more lower-income or
underrepresented candidates. As an extension of this, we would also advise that they recommend
more lower-income organizers for party nomination, introduce them to political circles, or
provide material support in upcoming elections, such as financial assistance, to bolster the
viability of lower-income political candidates.
Based on our experiences during the process of seeking to contact organizations,
including non-profits, carrying out work that engages with largely lower-income clients, we
would also offer several recommendations. What was perhaps the most concerning finding from
this process was a response from one such organization, which was engaged in rehabilitative
work that clients were not allowed regular computer access. This is particularly worrisome due
to the fact that, as aforementioned, internet means have been utilized widely as organizing tools,
and the internet is also intuitively how many people nowadays receive information of all kinds,
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with political information being not exempt from this trend. Thus, one may infer that clients in
spaces with similar policies are disproportionately, further structurally barred from accessing
political information and from the political activity this information may facilitate. Recognizing
that disconnecting clients from enabling networks is a crucial part of rehabilitation, and that as a
result the prospect of social media use may be too potentially dangerous, we would recommend
that in rehabilitative environments clients are allowed restricted and monitored computer access,
which would at least allow access to reputable news websites and campaign websites, as well as
the website of the state’s Secretary of State, which typically includes information on how to
register to vote and how to utilize mail-in-voting, for example, in order to ensure that these
especially marginalized and structurally isolated communities are not as severely
disenfranchised.
For Future Research
There are at least several avenues that would make interesting and worthwhile extensions
of this project in the future and are deserving of future inquiry. For example, we believe that an
in-depth examination of what barriers may exist in terms of political engagement and what
political experiences tend to consist of for those living in luxury apartments would provide a
very interesting point for comparison to the questions engaged with during this project regarding
these matters for lower-income people, although we believe these harms may be likely less
severe, due to the frequently contended comparatively higher degree of political access enjoyed
related to higher income encountered during our literature review. Further, more specific case
study work delving into specific examples of other public housing systems and examining their
histories (or lack thereof) with organizing groups and internal canvassing would also be
fascinating and add very meaningfully to this under-researched area. Additionally, deeper
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examination of the specific challenges faced by and experiences of lower-income people living
in rural communities would provide another very interesting comparison point. In contrast to the
examination of areas of disenfranchisement, it may be interesting to examine political methods
that have been widely popular and engaged with, including by marginalized communities. In
particular, due to recent increased engagement with protests, we believe it may be interesting to
examine the socioeconomic make-up of those who attend protests and engage in political
processes through this avenue. Finally, an area we believe must be engaged with within academic
discourse is to survey and gather information about the political perceptions of governmental
entities and campaigns by lower-income populations, including perceptions of feelings of
exploitation by these entities. We had originally attempted to include this in our research project
via a survey distributed to organizations doing work with lower-income communities, however
we faced a notable issue of non-response, very likely exacerbated by the current global
pandemic, which has placed additional burdens on all organizations working to provide
vulnerable populations foundational necessities, resulting in the inviability of this method.
However, we believe that this would be more feasible at another time and still incredibly
worthwhile to attempt through similar or different means. We also believe that there may be
good opportunities for other researchers to attempt an in-person variation of our survey method
in the future, which would allow easier community access, particularly if it were carried out in
collaboration with a community organization with connections with at least a few members of
that community.
Conclusion
Ultimately, this research project further affirms the existence of the tangible barriers,
including style of housing, that exist to mobilizing lower-income voters through external means,
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and the harms these barriers may pose on even general prospects for political engagement. More
specifically, this project adds to the literature documenting how large-scale apartment housing,
particularly public housing, acts itself as a physical, environmental barrier to the interactions of
campaigns and lower-income populations, and exacerbates the marginalization of already
marginalized communities. This project also resolves that simply allowing canvassing within
large-scale housing, particularly large public housing systems, may very likely not be a
satisfactory solution for the problem of disproportionate disengagement of those living in public
housing communities, due to the scale of such systems. Instead, my project affirms the
importance of grassroots organizing that places lower-income people, experiences, and causes at
the center and seeks to build networks of communications within such communities, as
evidenced through our literature review and interviews with those engaged in such networks. We
hope that this project will ultimately be joined by a future host of literature ameliorating this gap
in institutional understanding, and that our recommendations may prove useful to help
ameliorate this crucial issue.
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